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Human capabilities, such as technical/nontechnical skills, have begun to be recognized as
crucial factors for nuclear safety. One of the most common ways to improve human ca-
pabilities in general is training. The nuclear industry has constantly developed and used
training as a tool to increase plant efficiency and safety. An integrated training framework
was suggested for one of those efforts, especially during simulation training sessions of
nuclear power plant operation teams. The developed training evaluation methods are
based on measuring the levels of situation awareness of teams in terms of the level of
shared confidence and consensus as well as the accuracy of team situation awareness.
Verification of the developed methods was conducted by analyzing the training data of real
nuclear power plant operation teams. The teams that achieved higher level of shared
confidence showed better performance in solving problem situations when coupled with
high consensus index values. The accuracy of nuclear power plant operation teams'
situation awareness was approximately the same or showed a similar trend as that of
senior reactor operators' situation awareness calculated by a situation awareness accuracy
index (SAAI). Teams that had higher SAAI values performed better and faster than those
that had lower SAAI values.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Individuals have their own strengths and weaknesses. Those
strengths become more powerful when strengths are assem-
bled; the so-called “synergy effect”. Sometimes, one person's
strengths complement another's weaknesses. TeammembersH.B. Yim), phseong@kais
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behacan give warnings to each other and correct other members'
abnormal behavior and opinions by offering other points of
view so that human error can be prevented or, at least, serious
consequences caused by human behavior can bemitigated. In
addition to these general reasons, running nuclear power
plant (NPP) systems is beyond a single person's ability. Thus,t.ac.kr (P.H. Seong).
Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
Fig. 1 e A simple model of a learning unit.
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specialties and abilities working together. Normally, NPP
operation skills are composed of technical and nontechnical
skills. Technical skills deal with areas of science related to
plant operation [1]; nontechnical skills are areas of sociology
related to information exchanges among plant operators [2].
In our previous research, evaluation methods for both skills
have been proposed; however, the proposed methods have
two critical disadvantages in any sort of direct application in
team evaluation. First, the proposed technical skills evalua-
tion method was originally developed for the evaluation of
individuals; separately evaluated results for operators should
be put through a comparison analysis. Another problem is
that technical skills and nontechnical skills should be collec-
tively analyzed, because they are not mutually exclusive. In
this paper, an integrated skill training model and a team
performance evaluation method that considers the interde-
pendency of technical and nontechnical skills are suggested.Fig. 2 e A typical LU of SAT. LU, learning unit; SAT,
systematic approach to training.2. Development of an integrated training
model
No adequate trainingmodel for NPP operation teams has been
developed. Fortunately, the design of technical skills training,
such as technical lectures and simulation-based training to
deal with abnormal situations, can be based on a systematic
approach to training (SAT). Likewise, the design of nontech-
nical skills training requires a framework. Furthermore, the
integrated skill trainingmodel will help improve the operation
skills of personnel.
2.1. SAT
SAT is defined as a “logical progression from the identification
of competences to the development and implementation of
training towards achieving these competences” [3]. SAT-based
training is recommended by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)a for the training of NPP personnel. It is also a
requirement/standard in most countries in which NPPs
operate. This is codified in the safety guide as follows: “a
systematic approach to training should be used for the
training of plant personnel.” [4].
The purpose of training is to learn something, so after
training, evaluationmust be put into place to check howmuch
trainees have learned and to modify training to yield better
results from the next training. One cycle of such steps is called
a learning unit (LU). The LU is a formulation that facilitates
change, a change that will result in the trainee being able to do
something he/she could not do before going through the LU. In
other words, the LU facilitates a change in behavior. There are
four principal stages in a typical LU model as shown in Fig. 1
[5]. The steps are summarized as follows. (1) A training
objective must be set before training. (2) Trainers need to
know the level of trainees. This step requires the use of an
evaluation method. (3) Trainers conduct training. (4) Perfor-
mance should be assessed to check the effect of training.
A typical LU of SAT is shown in Fig. 2. Actually, the IAEA
recommends that training courses and seminars on man-
agement and supervisory skills, coaching andmentoring, self-assessment techniques, root cause analysis, team training,
and communication be developed based on SAT. Most of the
items mentioned here are related to nontechnical skills. Un-
fortunately, nontechnical skills training has been overlooked
in Korea and thus, no well-developed nontechnical skills
training programs based on SAT, nor evaluation methods, are
currently applied to further improve the operation skills of
NPP operation teams. Therefore, SAT was applied to the
development of simulation training and technical and
nontechnical skills evaluation processes in this research.
2.2. Integration of technical and nontechnical skill
training
Training systems in the nuclear industry are somewhat biased
toward enhancing technical skills. For example, nontechnical
skill training has been given in one-off seminars in Korea. Most
of the training sessions related to the operation of NPPs utilized
virtual reality running on a simulator. Thus, for efficiency's
sake, the evaluation of technical and nontechnical skills
together in one session of simulation training is necessary. A
new model of skill training and evaluation processes is
required to properly integrate and evaluate these two disci-
plines; such a model should be able to consider the interde-
pendency of these skills. Interdisciplinary training is “a process
of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a
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by a single discipline or profession,” and “draws on disciplinary
perspectives and integrates their insights through the con-
struction of a more comprehensive perspective” [6]. The most
important focus of interdisciplinary training today is on real
world problems. Interdisciplinary training, particularly in the
sciences and in some areas of the social sciences, tends to be ad
hoc. As Newell [7] expresses it, interdisciplinary learning takes
disciplines out of the academy and into the real world.
As can be seen in various works in the literature, the in-
tegrated model of skill training has been suggested for certain
situations, as shown in Fig. 3. New evaluation methods are
also needed for two types of skills when considering their
interdependency as explained in the next section.3. Development of quantitative evaluation
methods
First of all, factors are chosen for each skill. Endsley's [8]
situation model and the operator's cognitive process [9], as
shown in Fig. 4, identify that an operator's cognitive activ-
ities between the acquisition of information and operation
actions are comprised of situation awareness (SA) and de-
cision making. Considering that these models can be
broadened to include a team aspect, team SA and team
decision making are prime factors that affect team perfor-
mance. Thus, simulation training was conducted based on
the developed integrated skill training model, and team
performance was evaluated by measuring team SA and
team decision making.3.1. Team SA
It has been argued that, at a simple level, team SA comprises
three separate but related components: individual team
member SA, the SA of other team members (task-work SA),
and the SA of the overall team (teamwork SA). The team SAFig. 3 e An integrated model of skill training for NPP operation t
awareness with graphical expressions; NPP, nuclear power plawas selected as an indirect measure of the technical and
nontechnical skills of operation teams, based on a literature
survey that included several relevant works of previous
research. In this light, team SA can be defined as the sum of
the technical and nontechnical skills of each member of the
team, as shown in Fig. 5 [10].
Team SA has received less attention than individual SA.
The elaboration of SA in complex, collaborative environments
thus remains a challenge for the human factors research
community, both in relation to the development of theoretical
perspectives and of validmeasures, and to the development of
guidelines for systems, training, and procedure design [10].
The NPP operation environment is known as “C4i: command,
control, communication, computers and intelligence”. C4i is
the management infrastructure for defense and war or of any
other large or complex and dynamic resource systems [11]. C4i
systems comprise both human and technological agents and
are designed to gather information and facilitate the accurate
communication of this information between multiple agents
dispersed across multiple locations [12]. SA measurement
techniques for operators in such environments have to be able
to satisfy the following requirements: (1) the technique should
be capable of measuring SA simultaneously at different
geographical locations. (e.g., between main control room
(MCR) and the field); (2) the technique should be capable of
measuring both individual and team or shared SA; and (3) the
technique should be capable of measuring SA in real time.
Unfortunately, the techniques that are currently in use
have some limits in terms of satisfying all three of these re-
quirements. Again, Bayesian inference has been chosen as the
best way to accomplish those goals. Previously, quantitative
values as determined through Bayesian inference have been
defined according to the level of confidence of an operator in a
specific situation [13]. The level of confidence of each operator
for the expected situation is known to varywith the amount of
information that each operator has received. Thus, teamSA as
used in this study is defined as the level of shared confidence.
In Fig. 6, it can be seen that if the level of confidence of a senior
reactor operator (SRO) for situation A is assumed to be 0.9, andeams. CoRSAGE, computational representation of situation
nt.
Fig. 4 e Endsley's model of situation awareness and NPP operation process with the indirect support system. HMI, human
machine interface; I&C, instrumentation and control; NPP, nuclear power plant.
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electric operator (EO), the shared portion of the level of con-
fidence for all members is 0.1. Likewise, the shared portion of
the level of confidence for the twomembers is 0.6 (0.7e0.1); all
of this can be generalized as Eq. (1). The core concept of this
method is the ability to measure the shared amount of SA;
therefore, the level of confidence of 0.2 (0.9e0.7) as perceived
by one operator is excluded.
Level of shared confidenceðLSCÞ ¼ a1 þ
Xn1
i¼2
ðai  ai1Þ  n iþ 1n
(1)
where, 0  a1  a2  a3,…,  an  1.Fig. 5 e A process of team SA.LSC simply means that the sum of cross sections of each
member's SA weighted by numbers of team members who
share confidence. Thus, the portion of SA that someone owns
alone does not count. Examples of the level of confidence are
shown in Table 1.
3.2. Team decision making
Nontechnical skills were measured based on four important
factors by the measure called Non-Technical Skills Prepared-
ness (NoT-SkiP) [14]. However, measuring nontechnical skills
using only a few factors does not seem to be enough, because
nontechnical skills, if one takes the time to enumerate such
skills regardless of their relative importance, can be almostSA, situation awareness.
Fig. 6 e An example of LSC. EO, electric operator; LSC, level
of shared confidence; RO, reactor operator; SRO, senior
reactor operator.
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making, which is the last step of the human cognitive process,
can be the final destination of a cognitive activity when all
sorts of nontechnical skills are exerted based on the technicalTable 1 e Examples of LSCs and CIs.
CASE 1
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.9000
0.3500 0.3889
RO 0.6000
EO 0.1000
TO 0.1000
CASE 2
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.7000
0.3500 0.5000
RO 0.6000
EO 0.1000
TO 0.1000
CASE 3
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.9000
0.4000 0.4444
RO 0.7000
EO 0.1000
TO 0.1000
CASE 4
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.9000
0.3750 0.4167
RO 0.7000
EO 0.1000
TO 0.0000
CASE 5
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.9000
0.0000 0.0000
RO 0.0000
EO 0.0000
TO 0.0000
CASE 6
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.5000
0.5000 1.0000
RO 0.5000
EO 0.5000
TO 0.5000
CI, consensus index; EO, electric operator; LConf, level of confi-
dence; LSC, level of shared confidence; RO, reactor operator; SRO,
senior reactor operator; TO, turbine operator.skills of the team. Therefore, nontechnical skills, when
considering the technical skills of teams, could be measured
by measuring the level of team decision making quantita-
tively. Decisionmaking can be regarded as a cognitive process
that results in the selection of a course of action among
several alternative scenarios. Every decision making process
produces a final choice [15]. The output can be an action or an
opinion of choice [16]. Payne et al [17] also defined decision
making as an individual's use ofmultiple decision strategies in
different situations, including various simplifying methods or
choice heuristics; it is an adaptive response of a limited ca-
pacity information processor to the demands of complex de-
cision making.
The term “team decision making” is not pervasively
used. Instead, consensus decision making seems to be a
more popular term. Consensus decision making is a group
decision making process that seeks the consent of all par-
ticipants. Consensus may be defined professionally as an
acceptable resolution, one that can be supported, even if it
is not the “favorite choice” of each individual. Consensus is
defined in MerriameWebster's dictionary as general agree-
ment and as group solidarity of belief or sentiment. It is
used to describe both a decision and the process of reach-
ing a decision. Consensus decision making is thus con-
cerned with the process of deliberating and finalizing a
decision [18].
Decision problems often involve conflicts between values,
because no one option bestmeets all of the objectives. Some of
the decision strategies used by people can be thought of as
conflict confronting, and others can be thought of as conflict
avoiding [19]. This statement mainly represents a personal
perspective.When this statement is broadened to a team scale,
conflict between members will become the main problem.
According to the literature, the idea of a consensus index
has been proposed in Eq. (2).
Consensus indexðCIÞ ¼ LSC
maxðAÞ (2)
where, A ¼ {b1, b2, b3,…, bng.
The notation “bi” represents a level of confidence that each
team member has. “max(A)” here means the highest level of
confidence for a random situation X that the most informed
operator holds. If max(A) is wholly shared by team members
and they all have max(A), then, this means that all members
fully agree that the confronted situation is X. CI implies the
equality level of SA. If every member in the team has the same
level of SA, then CI of the team is 1. If dominantmembers in SA
appear, CI gets lower. Examples of CI are also shown in Table 1.
An abbreviation “TO” in Table 1 means a turbine operator.
3.3. Accuracy of situation awareness
Accuracy is the prime concernwhenmeasuring SA. Nomatter
how confident an operator is that the confronted situation is
X, if the real situation is Y, the operator is using inappropriate
technical skills. An accuracy measure that can reflect the
whole set of steps of SA was therefore required because the
process was an important factor in the study. First, accuracy
deviation using the root-mean-square deviation (RMSD)
method was proposed, as shown in Eq. (3). Where, LConfref is
Table 3 e An example of SAAIs for Teams 2 and 9.
Situations to identify LConfref LConfteam2
Coolant leaking 0.9987 0.3333
Operation limit abnormality 0.5000 0.0000
Leak inside CTMT 0.9971 0.9975
Incomplete LOCA iso. 0.9995 0.0000
SAAI 0.2775
Tasks to identify LConfref LConfteam9
Coolant leaking 0.9987 0.9987
Operation limit abnormality 0.5000 0.0000
Leak inside CTMT 0.9971 0.9960
Incomplete LOCA iso. 0.9995 0.9981
SAAI 0.7222
CTMT, containment; iso., isolation; LConfref, reference level of
confidence; LConf, level of confidence; LOCA, loss of coolant acci-
dent; SAAI, situation awareness accuracy index.
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confidence.
Accuracy deviationðADÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPn
i¼1

LConfref ;i  LConfo;i
2
n
vuut
(3)
The SA accuracy index can be calculated using AD as
shown in Eq. (4).
Situation Awareness Accuracy IndexðSAAIÞ
¼ 1 ADﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPn
i¼1 ðLConfref ; iÞ2
n
r (4)
Strictly speaking, SAAIwas developed to estimate the SA of
individuals under training or real conditions by comparing
actual individuals' SA with reference SA. Reference SA is
intended SA in training conditions or presumed SA under the
situation that we best understand. Team SA can be partially
deduced by summing SAAIs of each member in the team.
LConfref of a simple example shown in Table 2 is taken from
the first 20 minutes of the reference LOCA training scenario.
Designed plant states that teams must be aware of coolant
leaking, operation limit abnormality, leak inside the contain-
ment, and incomplete LOCA isolation in sequence. Operators
should notice these plant states by the timely activated
alarms and indicators as designed. When the team exactly
follows the process that the reference indicates, then the SAAI
is 1. It means that the operator understands and exactly
knows exactly what to do in such a situation. On the contrary,
if the team does not at all follow the process as the reference
indicates, then the SAAI is 0. An Example of SAAIs of real
operation Teams 1 and 3 shown in Table 3 and detailed find-
ings are depicted in the following results section.4. Case study
4.1. Data collection of an LOCA condition
To compare these results with the results of NoT-SkiP, loss of
coolant accident (LOCA) cases for the APR-1400 type reactor,Table 2 e A virtual example of SAAIs.
Situations to identify LConfref LConfteamA
Coolant leaking 0.9987 0.9987
Operation limit abnormality 0.5000 0.5000
Leak inside CTMT 0.9971 0.9971
Incomplete LOCA iso. 0.9995 0.9995
SAAI 1.0000
Tasks to identify LConfref LConfteamB
Coolant leaking 0.9987 0.0000
Operation limit abnormality 0.5000 0.0000
Leak inside CTMT 0.9971 0.0000
Incomplete LOCA iso. 0.9995 0.0000
SAAI 0.0000
CTMT, containment; iso., isolation; LConfref, reference level of
confidence; LConfteamA, team A level of confidence; LOCA, loss of
coolant accident; SAAI, situation awareness accuracy index.which was a new system to all participants, were considered
for verification of the integrated evaluation method. LOCA
emergency operation training of real plant operators in the
training center of the reference plant was recorded by Korea
Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd. Nine operation teams
participated in the training, and each team performed one
scenario. Training time was limited to ~ 50 minutes, to allow
for a fair comparison. An introduction part which was irrel-
evant to the process of the main scenario was removed from
the data.5. Results and discussion
The LSCs and CIs for the nine teams are shown in Table 4. LSC
and CI values of Team 1were 0 because Team 1 considered the
situation as a mixed event of steam generator tube rupture
and loss of feed water accident rather than LOCA. However,
Team 1 scored 28 for the operator performance assessment
system (OPAS) developed by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Halden Reactor Project,
because some functions indicated and operated by Team 1
were also used for a LOCA scenario. Judging by the results,
technical skills affect performance more than nontechnical
skills do, so teams with higher LSC scores showed better per-
formance. If a team has low technical skills, the team is likely
to have wrong values for SA or low values for LSC. There is the
possibility that a team with high CI and low LSC scores may
make an incorrect decision easily because CI has been used to
measure nontechnical skills. Teams 2e4 that failed to achieve
a given mission had similar OPAS scores compared with that
of Team 7, which succeeded to resolve given tasks. Failed
teams had fairly good CI values. Therefore the only reason that
could explain the difference between failure and success was
LSC scores. As mentioned, when the LSC score is high, a high
CI score accelerates to spread correct SA among members. On
the contrary, the possible explanation of team performance
with a high CI, LSC scores is that teams are either very active in
sharing their knowledge to figure out what is happening, and
yet do not know what it is and try hard to solve problems, but
theymisunderstand the situation, resulting in low LSC scores.
Team7 had a better LSC score and a little higher LConf value of
Table 4 e Examples of LSC and CI for Teams 1e9.
TEAM 1 (failed, OPAS 28)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.0000
0.0000 n/a
RO 0.0000
EO 0.0000
TO 0.0000
TEAM 2 (failed, OPAS 46)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.6213
0.2647 0.4260
RO 0.4443
EO 0.0000
TO 0.1701
TEAM 3 (failed, OPAS 42)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.4996
0.1874 0.3750
RO 0.3332
EO 0.0000
TO 0.0830
TEAM 4 (failed, OPAS 47)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.7970
0.2593 0.3253
RO 0.4335
EO 0.0000
TO 0.1701
TEAM 5 (failed, OPAS 51)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.7970
0.2993 0.3755
RO 0.5180
EO 0.0408
TO 0.1203
TEAM 6 (failed, OPAS 40)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.7166
0.1265 0.1765
RO 0.2114
EO 0.0000
TO 0.0830
TEAM 7 (succeeded, OPAS 45)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.8880
0.3180 0.3581
RO 0.5377
EO 0.0408
TO 0.1556
TEAM 8 (succeeded, OPAS 55)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.5660
0.2797 0.4942
RO 0.4993
EO 0.0000
TO 0.1203
Table 4 e (continued )
TEAM 1 (failed, OPAS 28)
Operators LConf LSC CI
TEAM 9 (succeeded, OPAS 63)
Operators LConf LSC CI
SRO 0.8880
0.4292 0.4834
RO 0.7530
EO 0.0408
TO 0.1701
CI, consensus index; EO, electric operator; LSC, level of shared
confidence; OPAS, operator performance assessment system; RO,
reactor operator; SRO, senior reactor operator; TO, turbine operator.
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suggest that the SRO of Team7 hadmore knowledge in a given
situation, actively shared information among members more
than the other three teams, and led the team to successfully
complete the mission. After the postexperimental investiga-
tion, we found out that the SRO for Team 8 had previous
knowledge and experience through similar training courses.
The SRO collected the least relevant information from ex-
pected places and sought extra information from elsewhere,
such as operators' outside or general knowledge. Conse-
quently, the calculated LSC valuewas low. The SRO exchanged
most information with the RO in the LOCA scenario; thus,
nontechnical skills between themmade up themajority of the
nontechnical skills of the team. An interesting point is that the
CI value of Team 8was very high; this means that the SRO and
the RO were very active in exchanging information and mak-
ing decisions. The results for individual operators' SA and
nontechnical skills can be evaluated by using Computational
Representation of Situation Awareness with Graphical Ex-
pressions (CoRSAGE) and NoT-SkiP. Team 1 seemed to have
very low knowledge. Team 5 could have succeeded a given
mission if they had a little more time. They had fairly good
scores in OPAS, LSC, and CI, but they were very slow to com-
plete the substeps. Unfortunately, this matter of “time limi-
tation” does not appear in any of the developed measures.
Other performancemeasures, such as completion time, can be
required to get a good evaluation result. Team 6 failed in the
given mission; it even had a high OPAS score because LSC and
CI were too low to solve the problems. Team8 had a high OPAS
score because the SRO acquired essential information selec-
tively. However, a low LCS score tells us that information on a
certain team is biased and, sometimes, this kind of blocked
information current may cause critical operation failures. The
LSC and CI values for Team 9 were high, as was the OPAS
score. Apparently, Team 9 performed the best among the nine
teams. SAAI can be used for both individuals and teams. One
restriction when using SAAI for the team SA measure is that
the structure of teams to make decision is horizontal, and all
members have the same portions of power to participate in
the decision making process. If the team has a hierarchical
decisionmaking structure, using adjustment features, such as
the weighting factor, are recommended to balance the portion
of impact among members that might lead evaluators to a
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is that many cases for each team are required to draw repre-
sentatively exact weights. There were two assumptions to
explain SAAI with real training conditions. The team structure
of Korean NPPs is unique in that the order in rank is rather
firm, and the decisions flow from top to bottom. Thus most of
the decisions were coming out of the SRO. This study also
assumed that information regarding all situations in the MCR
converges to the SRO in a timely manner. With these as-
sumptions, an SRO's SA fully represented team SA in the
example case of Table 3. Operators in Team 9 gave the exact
information that a training designer expected for the first part
of the scenario. However, operators in Team 2 missed deliv-
ering some pieces of information to the SRO, who was not as
confident as the SRO of Team 9 that there was a leak point in
the plant. SROs in both teams were not able to recognize that
the plant operation limit condition was not normal, because
none of the members in either team succeeded in delivering
suitable information to their SROs. When LConfs are defined,
SAAI is calculated by deviations of SRO's confidence for each
state that the training designer designates as being important
for trainees to deal with confronting situations that can be
acquired by following reference situations. The teams that had
SROs scored relatively high SAAI. For example, Team 5 failed
on some occasions because team structures for making de-
cisions were more horizontal than we assumed, and thus
precise weighting factors were required to draw a correct
evaluation result using SAAI. In this case, SAAI is recom-
mended for use with other measures such as CI or OPAS.
However, SAAI showed its capability in supporting the team
performance evaluation process and that a good understand-
ing of situations helps solve problems.6. Discussion
An NPP is basically designed to be run by people with various
specialties and abilities working together. Operators have to
be trained to maintain their operation capabilities above a
certain level by law in many countries. Training is defined as
“the systematic development of the knowledge, skills and
abilities (KSAs) required by an individual to perform
adequately a given task or job” [20]. This implies that the role
of training is to achieve the right mix of the KSAs of trainees
and to help jobholders to perform tasks successfully. There-
fore, the term “performance” for teams is interwoven with
training. To achieve performance improvement, especially in
the nuclear industry, training must lead operators to an
enhancement of professional knowledge and skills both at
individual and team levels. It should equip operators to
respond appropriately to emerging challenges, such as reactor
trips or perturbations of plant parameters, as well as to
appropriate changes in attitude.
As has already been mentioned, NPP operation skills are
composed of technical and nontechnical skills, and evalua-
tion methods for each skill have been developed. In this
paper, an integrated skill training model and training evalu-
ation methods that can consider the interdependency of
technical and nontechnical skills have been proposed to help
improve performance of NPP operation teams. For integratedtraining evaluation, team SA and team decision making were
selected as measurands. There have been several attempts to
measure team SA, so it is worthwhile to develop valid mea-
sures of team SA for many potential applications. The
developed SA measurement technique satisfies the re-
quirements for a C4i environment: (1) measuring SA simul-
taneously at different geographical locations; (2) measuring
both individual and team or shared SA; and (3) measuring SA
in real time. Measuring team SA is attempted by considering
nontechnical skills, and a quantitative approach enables
training evaluators to include as many trainees as they could
consider regardless of trainees' geolocation. Also, the devel-
opment of an automated calculation tool enabled real time
SA measurement. Accuracy is the prime concern when
measuring SA to a good level of confidence. Thus, an accuracy
measure that can reflect the whole set of steps of SA has been
proposed that defines AD based on the root-mean-square
deviation method. Decision making problems often involve
conflicts between values, because no one option best meets
all of our objectives. The term “team decision making” is not
pervasively used. Instead, consensus decision making seems
to be the more popular term. Consensus decision making is a
group decision making process that seeks the consent of all
participants; thus, the idea of CI has been proposed for teams.
The values from each method can give trainers profound
insights into any considerations of technical and nontech-
nical skills together. These values can also be used in
debriefing sessions that are normally held for analysis of
training. One strong point in the use of quantitative methods
is that measures can approximately define relatively insuf-
ficient skills with clear distinction, so that rapid remediation
can be given to trainees. The proposed methods still have
shortcomings for a direct application to team performance
evaluation during training. One is that the proposedmethods
still require a collective analysis of technical and nontech-
nical skills for further detailed evaluation results. CoRSAGE,
the technical skills evaluation method, was originally devel-
oped for the evaluation of individuals and thus, separately
evaluated results for operators should be subject to a com-
parison analysis. There is still a need for more data sets to
statistically validate themethods. Although, the results so far
shows strong advantages in addressing team behaviors that
currently usedmethods such as OPAS cannot exactly express
in simulator based team training. LSC and CI can instantly
represent team characteristics at any time during the
training session, and we hope that these features will
enhance training efficiency.Conflicts of interest
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